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Patents at the Supreme Court: 
It Could've Been Worse 
Gregory Dolin* 
I. Introduction 
Since the formation of the u.s. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in 1984, the Supreme Court has taken a mostly "hands-off" 
approach to patent cases. Indeed, in the first 20 years of the Federal 
Circuit's existence, the Supreme Court heard only 10 cases dealing 
with substantive patent law (and two of these cases dealt with rather 
esoteric issues of plant patents). Since 2004, however, the Court 
has shown increased interest in engaging with patent law and has 
granted at least 16 substantive patent cases on issues as varied as pat-
ent-eligible subject matter and the interaction of patent and FDA law. 
In taking these cases, the Supreme Court has been widely viewed 
as attempting to "rein in" the overly patent-friendly Federal Circuit. 
Whether or not this was the Supreme Court's goal or intent, it is un-
deniable that, on balance, its rulings have been far less solicitous of 
patentees than those emanating from the Federal Circuit. 
In the last few years in particular, the Court has expanded the zone 
of exclusion from patent eligibility, 1 limited the availability of injunc-
tive relief for patentees whose patents have been adjudged to be valid 
and infringed,2 and broadened the scope of the patent exhaustion 
doctrine.3 To be sure, not all of the Supreme Court's decisions were 
"anti-patent." For example, the Court chose to adhere to the rule that 
* Associate Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Medicine & Law, University of 
Baltimore School of Law; Adjunct Associate Professor of Emergency Medicine, Johns 
Hopkins University School of Medicine. Many thanks to Irina Manta, Tara Helfman, 
and Adam Mossoff for their help in drafting this article. 
lMayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
2 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.s. 388 (2006). 
3 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.s. 617 (2008). 
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anyone seeking to challenge an issued patent's validity may do so 
only by the standard of" clear and convincing evidence," rather than 
by the lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard, as many 
law professors have been urging it to do.4 Nonetheless, the overall 
trajectory of the Court's patent jurisprudence has been toward a nar-
rower set of patent rights. Thus, there was significant trepidation in 
the patent bar and the academy when the Supreme Court decided to 
hear three patent cases this term: Bowman v. Monsanto,S Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,6 and FTC v. Actavis.7 Each of 
the cases had the potential to rewrite decades of patent law and sig-
nificantly upend major industries that have come to rely on patents. 
Ultimately, however, the Court adopted an incremental approach to 
each of the problems it addressed. And though the overall outcome 
in this term's patent cases leaves quite a lot to be desired, the worst 
fears of the patent-dependent industries did not come to pass. 
II. Bowman v. Monsanto 
Bowman turned out to be perhaps the least controversial of the in-
tellectual property cases before the Court-though the case certainly 
elicited much attention because Monsanto Company was the other 
party to a dispute that involved genetically modified organisms 
(CMOs). Yet it is precisely because the issue seemed so clear-cut that 
the decision to hear Bowman raised significant worries about the di-
rection that the Supreme Court might take. 
At issue in the case was a type of soybean produced by Monsanto. 
By modifying the soybean's genetic makeup, the company was able 
to create and patent a bean that is resistant to certain pesticides-spe-
cifically to Monsanto's own Roundup. In other words, a farmer plant-
ing these particular soybeans (known as Roundup Ready) can spray 
his field with Roundup pesticide confident that the chemical will kill 
unwanted weeds but will leave the soybean cash crop unaffected. It 
should come as no surprise that Monsanto charges a premium for the 
4 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
5 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 s. Ct. 1761 (2013). 
6 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 s. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
7 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 s. Ct. 2223 (2013). This article will not discuss Actavis beyond 
noting that in that case, as in the other two, the Court, though taking an anti-patent 
step, made sure that that step was rather modest. 
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advantage that the pesticide-resistant seed provides. A seed bought 
from Monsanto is thus significantly more expensive than a seed 
bought from a grain elevator. 
When the farmer buys a Roundup Ready seed, he ends up grow-
ing more identical seeds, owing to the genetic features of the initial 
seed. That is, a farmer who planted one seed will, at the end of the 
season, end up with several dozen identical seeds borne by the plant 
that sprouted from the original. Absent unexpected (and unlikely) 
genetic mutations, these new seeds have the same features as the 
original seed-they too are Roundup-proof. Theoretically, then, a 
farmer wishing to grow Roundup Ready soybeans only needs to buy 
seeds from Monsanto once with every subsequent generation being 
regrown from that original purchase. 
Monsanto recognized this problem and sought to address it 
through contractual arrangements. When selling its patented soy-
beans either to farmers directly or to authorized dealers, the com-
pany secures a contractual promise from buyers that they will use 
the purchased seeds to grow only a single generation of soybean 
plants and won't use the resultant seeds to plant a second genera-
tion of plants. Vernon Bowman, a commercial farmer, purchased 
Roundup Ready seeds from Monsanto's authorized dealer and 
signed the appropriate contract. He honored the terms of the con-
tract with respect to the seeds that he purchased from Monsanto 
and its dealers. The seeds that Bowman grew from this original 
purchase were all harvested and sold to a grain elevator, with none 
kept for additional replanting. Bowman, however, found what he 
thought was an ingenious way of circumventing Monsanto's con-
tractual restrictions. After selling his own harvest of soybeans, he 
purchased more soybeans, but this time not from Monsanto or any 
of its dealers but from a grain elevator. Though the grain elevator 
had a mixture of beans, it was fairly easy for Bowman to separate 
the progeny of the original Monsanto seeds from that of unmodi-
fied seeds. All Bowman had to do was to plant the seeds bought 
from the grain elevator and then spray them with Roundup. The 
second-generation Roundup Ready seeds would survive, whereas 
the second-generation unmodified seeds would not. Bowman 
would then be able to harvest the surviving seeds and sell the bulk 
of them while keeping a sufficient amount for planting the follow-
ing year, when he would be able to repeat the process. 
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This subterfuge allowed Bowman to avoid paying Monsanto's 
high premium for its patented soybean and instead to pay the regu-
lar commodity price for soybeans. The grain elevator, meanwhile, 
couldn't charge the premium for the patented soybean as opposed to 
the unmodified natural one because it's not in the business of selling 
soybeans for future agricultural use. Indeed, federal law explicitly 
prohibits grain elevators from packaging or marketing their wares as 
agricultural products.8 Thus, from the perspective of a grain eleva-
tor, a modified soybean is identical to an unmodified soybean, and 
is worth exactly the same. For that reason, all soybeans are stored 
together and the same commodity price is charged for all of them-
regardless of whether they're descendants of the originally patented 
seed. Accordingly, the grain elevator (unlike Monsanto or any of its 
authorized dealers) could not and would not insist on a contractual 
promise that purchased seeds not be used for multiple generations 
of agricultural use. 
Eventually, Monsanto discovered Bowman's operation and filed 
suit alleging that his activities infringed Monsanto's patents, which 
claimed (in one form or another) a modified gene that encoded for 
the herbicide resistance.9 Monsanto argued that by growing new 
seeds that contain the patented gene, Bowman was infringing Mon-
santo's exclusive rights to "make[], use[], offer[] to sell, or sell[]" the 
patented invention.10 Given that he was in fact producing seeds con-
taining the patented gene, Bowman was forced to concede that he in-
deed "makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells" the patented product. The 
statute, however, makes an infringer only out of an individual who 
"makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells" the patented invention without 
authority.l1 Bowman argued that his production of new seeds was 
authorized by the doctrine of patent exhaustion-which holds that 
once the patentee has made an authorized sale of a patented inven-
tion, the purchaser can use the sold product or resell it to others as 
he sees fit and on whatever terms he sees fit. Bowman argued that 
the doctrine prevents Monsanto from objecting to downstream uses 
8 See 7 U.s.c. § 1571; Ind. Code § 15-15-1-32 (2012); Bowman, supra note 5, at 1765. 
9 U.s. Patent Nos. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993) and RE39,247 E (filed Aug. 22, 2006); 
Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing the patented 
technology). 
10 35 U.s.c. § 271(a). 
11 ld. 
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of its patented seed because Monsanto exhausted its patent rights 
via the original sale of the modified soybean. He also argued that 
whatever contractual restrictions Monsanto tried to place on the use 
of the seed post-sale were void because they were inconsistent with 
the nature of the transaction between Monsanto and the dealers or 
farmers, thus constituting an "end run" around the patent exhaus-
tion doctrine. 
Bowman lost the infringement suit and the subsequent appeal to 
the Federal Circuit.12 The Supreme Court granted Bowman's petition 
for the writ of certiorari to address whether the Federal Circuit erred 
when it created "an exception to the doctrine of patent exhaustion 
for self-replicating technologies."13 Given the unanimity of the Fed-
eral Circuit panel-which included a judge generally regarded as a 
skeptic of broad patent law claims-the cert grant was somewhat of 
a surprise. As the old adage goes, the Supreme Court doesn't grant 
cases to affirm, and that has been especially true as of late with cases 
emanating from the Federal Circuit. 
The question was whether the Supreme Court would take a 
broader view of patent exhaustion than did the lower courts, thus 
potentially undermining the very business model of companies mak-
ing GMOs. Had the Court adopted Bowman's argument, it would 
necessarily follow that companies like Monsanto would be able to 
enjoy their exclusive rights to make and sell their technology for only 
a year or two (rather than the statutory 20 years of the patent term) 
because after the first year of sales, downstream purchasers would be 
able to reproduce the patented GMOs and sell them in competition 
with the patentee. Each subsequent year would potentially bring in 
more and more competitors until the price for the patented GMO 
soybean would be equivalent to the cost of raising any soybean. In 
other words, the patent holder would be unable to charge a premium 
and so would reap a much lower profit than it can now, perhaps to 
the point of not even being able to recoup the initial investment in 
creating the seed. The Supreme Court then was in a perfect position 
to do considerable damage to an industry that is dependent on pat-
ent protection for its business model. 
12 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834 (S.D. Ind. 2009), af£' d, 657 F.3d 134l. 
13 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012). 
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What made the grant all the more suspicious was the attack on a 
1992 Federal Circuit case, Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc,14 Bow-
man's cert petition expressly asked the Court to overrule Mallinck-
rodt. The United States, appearing as amicus curiae, though ostensi-
bly supporting affirmance of the decision below, endorsed Bowman's 
argument on this point. The Mallinckrodt case is interesting because 
it stands for the proposition that the patentee can avoid triggering 
the patent exhaustion rights if it contractually restricts the post-sale 
use of the patented device. In Mallinckrodt, the Federal Circuit held 
that when the patentee sold certain medical devices imprinted with 
"single-use only" notice, disregarding such notice and reusing the 
devices constituted patent infringement. The Mallinckrodt decision 
has come under much criticism over the last 20 years, so the Supreme 
Court's decision to review Bowman's lawsuit was viewed as a signal 
that perhaps the Court not only would broaden the scope of patent 
exhaustion doctrine, but also would limit the licensing arrangements 
that have grown common between purveyors and users of various 
patented goods. 
Ultimately, however, the Court dashed those fears-or hopes, 
depending on which side of the issue you happen to be on-by is-
suing a short and almost playful unanimous opinion that explicitly 
declined to address the particular problems posed by self-replicating 
technologies.ls The ruling was altogether silent on the permissible 
scope of licensing arrangements that are meant to counterbalance 
the patent exhaustion doctrine. Instead, the Court merely reaffirmed 
the uncontroversial proposition that the patent exhaustion doctrine 
"restricts a patentee's rights only as to the 'particular article' sold, 
it leaves untouched the patentee's ability to prevent a buyer from 
making new copies of the patented item."16 This proposition was so 
uncontroversial that Bowman readily conceded it in his brief and 
at oral argument. This concession proved fatal to Bowman's caseY 
Simply put, the Court concluded that by growing successive genera-
tions of Roundup Ready soybean seeds, Bowman was making new, 
additional patented soybeans-an activity beyond the scope of the 
14 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
15 Bowman, supra note 5, at 1769. 
16 ld. at 1766. 
17 ld. 
272 
Patents at the Supreme Court 
patent exhaustion doctrine. And though the Court agreed that seeds 
are generally meant to be planted and thus Monsanto would likely 
be unable to restrict the planting (or other use) of the very seeds pur-
chased from itself or an authorized dealer had it attempted to do so, 
the replanting of new seeds and growing additional generations of 
the patented product were outside the safe harbor provisions of the 
exhaustion doctrine. 
The Court unquestionably got the answer right. As Justice Elena 
Kagan recognized in her unanimous opinion, under a contrary holding: 
Monsanto's patent would provide scant benefit. After 
inventing the Roundup Ready trait, Monsanto would, to be 
sure, "receiv[e] [its] reward" for the first seeds it sells. But 
in short order, other seed companies could reproduce the 
product and market it to growers, thus depriving Monsanto 
of its monopoly. And farmers themselves need only buy 
the seed once, whether from Monsanto, a competitor, or (as 
here) a grain elevator. The grower could multiply his initial 
purchase, and then multiply that new creation, ad infinitum-
each time profiting from the patented seed without 
compensating its inventor.18 
The trouble, though, is that the question the Court answered was 
not of particular importance to anyone. Both Bowman and Mon-
santo agreed "that the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the 
right to 'make' a new product."19 The answer to that question in no 
way depends on various contractual arrangements that Monsanto 
and its dealers entered into with farmers like Bowman. Bowman 
would have been adjudged an infringer even absent the restrictive 
covenants in the sale, because what he violated was not a contractual 
clause-after all, he bought his seeds from a grain elevator and not 
from Monsanto-but Monsanto's exclusive right to make new, ad-
ditional copies of the patented product. 
Two far more interesting questions remained unanswered after 
Bowman. First, can a patentee sidestep the exhaustion doctrine via re-
strictive contractual covenants attendant to the sale of a patented de-
vice? Second, in the case of self-replicating technologies, can a party 
whose wares, through no fault of his own, were contaminated by a 
18 ld. at 1767 (citations omitted). 
19 ld. at 1766 (citations omitted). 
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patented product be an "infringer" within the meaning of 35 U.s.c. 
§ 271? In other words, had Monsanto's soybeans been blown over 
onto Bowman's field and cross-pollinated his plants-causing some 
of Bowman's seeds to contain the patented gene--would Bowman 
still be liable for infringement? The Court chose not to answer either 
of these questions in its opinion, perhaps because this case was a 
poor vehicle to address those issues. After all, Bowman was not an 
innocent party whose fields were simply contaminated by Monsan-
to's product. Nor did he plant his seeds in violation of a contractual 
obligation with the patent holder. Thus, there was no need to delve 
into these matters. 
But that does not mean that these issues simply disappear. Instead, 
they have been deferred. When they come up-and they will-the 
Court will need to consider seriously how to reconcile the strict liabil-
ity nature of infringement with the unavoidable infringement result-
ing from actions of the patentee (and forces of nature) alone. It's quite 
possible that the doctrine of patent exhaustion at issue in Bowman 
isn't the best tool to resolve this problem, and therefore this question 
was best left unaddressed in the present case. However, companies 
like Monsanto may need to develop legal arguments in anticipation 
of future cases. Similarly, the patent world is now on notice that the 
federal government views Mallinckrodt as incorrectly decided and 
should expect that argument to be made in due course to the Su-
preme Court. Patent-reliant companies should be prepared to adjust 
their business models accordingly. For now, though, industries that 
rely heavily on patented technology can breathe a little more easily 
knowing that the Court didn't expand the doctrine of patent exhaus-
tion to the point at which it would undermine the de facto term of the 
patent and therefore the economic incentives to innovate. 
III. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics 
Whereas Bowman ultimately broke no new ground by relying ex-
clusively on well-established and agreed-upon precedent and defer-
ring the hard questions for later, Myriad did none of those things, in-
stead plunging head-on into scientific issues that the Court, judging 
from oral arguments, clearly did not understand. The result was an 
incoherent opinion instead of a clear exposition of patent law. That 
said, the ultimate outcome in Myriad is not as bad or as radical as 
claimed by the petitioners and by a large segment of legal academia. 
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Myriad Genetics is a company located in Salt Lake City. In the late 
1980s, scientists worldwide, realizing that certain forms of breast and 
ovarian cancer have a genetic component, began searching for genes 
that increase the likelihood of developing these maladies. Among the 
hundreds of scientists searching for the answer, Myriad was first to 
find the location of the gene and first to decode its chemical structure 
or, in the words of molecular genetics, its "sequence." Myriad man-
aged to separate the cancer-causing gene from the thousands of other 
genes located on the same chromosome and to develop a test capable of 
confirming the presence or absence of mutations in that gene. Between 
1997 and 2000, Myriad obtained a number of patents on the method 
of testing for breast cancer and on the isolated gene itself. Because the 
company had these patents, it possessed exclusive rights to conduct 
genetic testing for the particular genes known as BRCA1 and BRCA2 
(pronounced "brack-uh one" and "brack-uh two"). Myriad did license 
a number of laboratories to conduct the same tests, but it was under no 
legal obligation to do so and extracted a price for its license. Unsurpris-
ingly, Myriad charged a higher price than it would have been able to if 
it had multiple competitors providing the same testing service. 
Unhappy with this state of affairs, a collection of doctors, patients, 
and medical organizations sued Myriad and sought to declare these 
patents invalid. Throughout the litigation, the challengers essentially 
argued that genetic materials are not human "inventions," but rather 
"products of nature" and thus beyond the scope of patent protec-
tion. This argument was accepted wholesale by the district court, but 
rejected, in a split decision, by the Federal Circuit, which held that 
isolated DNA isn't a product of nature and is therefore eligible for 
patent protection.2O In 2012, the Supreme Court vacated that decision 
and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit in light of a case it had 
just decided, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., which lim-
ited the scope of patent-eligible subject matter.21 On remand, the Fed-
eral Circuit reissued its original decision with only minor changes.22 
The Supreme Court again granted cert. 
20 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. u.s. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 
(SD.N.Y. 2010), afi'd in part & rev'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
21 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
22 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. u.s. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir.2012). 
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To understand the nature of the legal dispute in Myriad, it is neces-
sary to understand the basic science underlying the case. Bear with 
me through this section, because grasping it is key to understanding 
what's going on here and evaluating the Supreme Court's ruling.23 
A DNA molecule consists of two strands of a repetitive sugar-
phosphate chain called deoxyribose. Each strand is a long molecule 
(called a polymer) composed of four types of subunits molecular 
bases known as adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine-(" A," 
"C," "G," and "T," respectively, if you recall your high school biol-
ogy)-leading to a structure resembling four kinds of beads strung 
on a necklace. Each adenine base on one strand is paired with a thy-
mine base on the other, and each cytosine base is paired with a gua-
nine base, generating strands that are complementary, not identical. 
The DNA molecule can be visualized as a zipper with each strand 
serving as tape and the A, C, T, G base pairs forming the teeth. Un-
like a regular zipper, a molecule of DNA is neither straight nor flat. 
Instead, in its "native" state-the state it assumes naturally inside a 
living organism-the DNA molecule is twisted into a spiral ladder 
shape, giving rise to the famous" double helix" model. The chemical 
and physical properties of native DNA emerge from this combination 
of factors: the entire sequence of base pairs (rather than a particular 
isolated fragment); the chemical modification of its nucleotides; the 
association with proteins such as "histones"; and the overall pack-
aging into superstructures such as chromosomes. Each of these fac-
tors plays a role in defining and controlling native DNA's molecular 
weight, chemical charge, three-dimensional structure, responsive-
ness to particular chemicals and enzymes, availability of electrons 
for other chemical reactions, and every other property. 
The function of DNA is to provide a set of genetic instructions 
for the production of other critical molecules: proteins. Amino acids 
are the building blocks of proteins, and DNA codes for amino acids. 
This coding operates by grouping nucleotides together in groups of 
three. Mathematically, each triad drawn from the set of four nucleo-
tides defines a potentially distinct code, yielding 64 distinct possible 
values, or "codons."24 For reasons not wholly understood, genes 
23 For a more detailed exposition see Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The 
New Frontier of FDA Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 Iowa L. R. 1399, 1407-17 (2013). 
24Because there are only 20 amino acids, several codons may code for the same amino 
acid. 
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have noncoding regions (known as "introns") that are interspersed 
among coding regions (known as "exons"). Indeed, the majority of 
genetic material consists of noncoding regions. Mutations in a codon 
sequence-which may occur, for example, by adding or deleting a 
nucleotide or by changing one nucleotide into another-often re-
sult in coding for an incorrect amino acid, leading to a defective or 
completely nonfunctional protein. Thus, when diagnosing genetic 
disorders, it is important to compare the subject sequence with both 
the normal sequence and all known mutations. Furthermore, though 
DNA is composed of two strands, only one strand codes for proteins, 
while the other simply binds the coding strand. Which strand is cod-
ing and which is merely binding can change from one gene to an-
other, however, and even occasionally within a single gene. 
DNA doesn't directly code for proteins. Instead, an intermediary 
molecule known as RNA is used. Thus, the process of "decrypting" 
the DNA's code begins when the DNA region containing the rel-
evant active gene is "transcribed" into a corresponding RNA mol-
ecule. RNA is composed of nucleotides attached to a single strand 
of a sugar molecule called ribose (as opposed to the dual strands of 
deoxyribose in DNA). In a similar vein, single-stranded RNA tran-
scribes only the coding strand, never the binding strand. RNA and 
DNA differ in several other significant ways as well. Unlike the na-
tive DNA strand that contains multiple genes, only some of which 
are active, an RNA molecule contains only a single active gene. Also 
unlike DNA, RNA lacks the bound histones that fold DNA into the 
complex chromosomal structures. RNA strands also possess several 
chemical modifications that native DNA lacks. 
Finally, before protein production can begin, a further preprocess-
ing step, known as "RNA splicing," removes noncoding introns from 
the RNA and splices the remaining exons together in an uninter-
rupted string known as "messenger RNA," or mRNA. That sets the 
stage for the "translation" step, where cellular mechanisms read the 
mRNA, one codon at a time, to produce the final protein structure. 
Myriad's patents claimed two types of DNA structures. First, they 
claimed an isolated gene coding for BRCAI and BRCA2.25 In other 
words, the claim covered a gene excised from the chromosome, sepa-
rated from various associated proteins and neighboring genes, and 
25 See, e.g., claim 1 of u.s. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed on May 5, 1998). 
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otherwise purified.26 It's important to understand that contrary to 
various press accounts, Myriad did not attempt to patent genes that 
are carried by individuals as part of their genetic makeup. Instead, 
Myriad created and patented a small molecule that, standing alone, 
isn't carried by any individual. The second set of claims was directed 
to a yet further-refined molecule: Myriad constructed a DNA mol-
ecule that was complementary to the sequence of mRNA. In other 
words, like mRNA (and unlike the native-state DNA) this molecule 
no longer had any noncoding introns. Instead, it had only the cod-
ing exon regions. In all other respects, it had features of DNA rather 
than RNA. This molecule, because it is complementary to the RNA 
molecule, is known as cDNAP 
The petitioners in Myriad argued that neither isolated DNA nor 
cDNA are patent-eligible because both are products of nature. Under 
longstanding patent principles, only inventions created by human 
ingenuity are eligible for a patent, while naturally occurring prod-
ucts-for example, gold, trees, and so forth-are not patent-eligi-
ble.28 The petitioners' argument rested on the premise that, isolated 
or not, these pieces of DNA ultimately perform the same function as 
naturally occurring DNA: they code for proteins. In other words, na-
tive DNA, isolated DNA, and cDNA all carry the same information. 
In the petitioners' view, DNA's information-carrying capacity ren-
dered all DNA molecules carrying that information patent-ineligible 
subject matter. 
Myriad, on the other hand, pointed out that these precise mol-
ecules (whether isolated DNA or cDNA) never existed in nature 
until isolated from larger structures. The company argued, and the 
Federal Circuit agreed, that the molecules described in the patents 
have vastly different chemical properties-such as molecular weight, 
ionic charge, and ability to react with other reagents-than naturally 
26Technically, the claim went to a wholly synthetic DNA molecule that merely had the 
same nucleotide sequence that an excised piece of a chromosome would have had. 
This fact alone should have sufficed to settle the patent-eligibility question. The Court 
chose to read the claim more broadly, however, so that it would cover not just syn-
thetic constructs but also genetic material excised from the chromosome. I engage the 
Court's reasoning on its own terms. 
27See, e.g., claim 2 of u.s. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed on May 5,1998). 
28 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.s. 303, 309 (1980). 
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occurring molecules. In short, the dispute centered on whether DNA 
should be judged on its chemical or biological functions. 
The solicitor general, arguing the case as amicus curiae, took a 
"split the baby" approach. With respect to native DNA, he argued 
that isolated DNA is too similar to what occurs in nature to qualify 
for patent protection. With respect to cDNA, however, he argued that 
human intervention was of sufficient magnitude to make the resul-
tant product patent-eligible. 
The Court's opinion ultimately adopted the solicitor general's po-
sition and held isolated DNA to be patent-ineligible but cDNA to 
be patent-eligible. Surprisingly, this split decision prompted news 
media worldwide to announce that the Court "invalidated gene 
patents."29 That isn't what the Court did, although the media's con-
fusion is understandable given the incoherent nature of the opinion. 
In concluding that isolated DNA is not patent-eligible subject matter, 
the Court, per Justice Clarence Thomas, concluded that 
Myriad's claims [are notl saved by the fact that isolating DNA 
from the human genome severs chemical bonds and thereby 
creates a nonnaturally occurring molecule. Myriad's claims 
are simply not expressed in terms of chemical composition, 
nor do they rely in any way on the chemical changes that 
result from the isolation of a particular section of DNA. 
Instead, the claims understandably focus on the genetic 
information .... [Ilts claim is concerned primarily with the 
information contained in the genetic sequence, not with the 
specific chemical composition of a particular molecule.3o 
The Court apparently agreed with the petitioners' argument that 
DNA is primarily an information-carrying molecule, not subject to 
the same rules as other chemical molecules. But a mere page later, in 
a single, cursory paragraph, Justice Thomas wrote that the "creation 
of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in an exons-only molecule 
that is not naturally occurring," making "cDNA ... distinct from the 
DNA from which it was derived. As a result, cDNA is not a 'product 
29 See, e.g., David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rejects Gene Patents, L.A. Times, Jun. 14, 
2013, at l. 
30 Myriad, supra note 6, at 2118 (emphasis in original). 
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of nature' and is patent eligible."31 There is no mention of cDNA's 
information-carrying capacity. 
The legal analysis leading to the conclusion of patent ineligibility 
for isolated DNA is thus irreconcilable with the legal analysis leading 
to the conclusion of patent eligibility for cDNA. Whereas the former 
looks to the information encoded in the DNA molecule, the latter 
looks at its chemical structure. No explanation is given as to why 
such different approaches are appropriate. 
The concluding section of the opinion makes the matter even more 
opaque. There, Justice Thomas states that the methods used by Myriad 
to find and isolate BRCAI and BRCA2 genes "were well understood, 
widely used, and fairly uniform insofar as any scientist engaged in 
the search for a gene would likely have utilized a similar approach."32 
But it's unclear why this is legally significant. Methods for creating 
cDNA are also "well understood, widely used, and fairly uniform." 
But it has long been the law that the method of arriving at an inven-
tion isn't relevant to the inquiry of whether the invention is novel or 
patent-eligible. The inclusion of this phrase only adds confusion to 
the requirements for patent eligibility going forward. Will the courts 
below now be required not only to identify the amount of difference 
between a lab-created product and naturally occurring substances, but 
also to determine whether "enough effort" went into creating these 
differences? If so, how much effort will be "enough"? It remains to be 
seen how the Federal Circuit and district courts apply this decision to 
new facts, but the creation of these problems was entirely unnecessary. 
The reason for this confusion is the Court's accepting the errone-
ous argument that DNA is somehow unique with respect to its infor-
mation-carrying function and capacity. In fact, there's nothing partic-
ularly unique about DNA. It's true that DNA carries information that 
the cellular mechanisms then use to make RNA and proteins. But the 
same can be said about a number of other molecules. For example, 
a number of molecules work by binding to cellular proteins on the 
outside of the cell, which results in a chain reaction inside the cell 
leading to very particular outcomes. Such molecules could be easily 
described as "information-carrying" because they carry instructions 
for the cell to act a certain way at a certain time. Other proteins bind 
31 ld. at 2119. 
32 ld. at 2120. 
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to DNA itself in order to activate or deactivate certain genes. This 
process too could be described as "information-carrying" because 
only as a result of such binding do cellular mechanisms know when 
to express a particular gene and when to leave it quiescent. 
Much medical research is centered on intervening in these pro-
cesses to modify the expression of certain deleterious genes or to 
enhance the expression of beneficial genes. Laboratory-designed 
molecules must have the same "informational" capacity as naturally 
occurring molecules to work. Consider laboratory-made insulin. 
Most of it is either identical or nearly identical to naturally occur-
ring insulin,33 and for good reason. If the laboratory-designed mol-
ecule were different, it wouldn't be insulin at all, and could not treat 
diabetes. This similarity to the naturally occurring product is to be 
celebrated and rewarded rather than held as the basis for patent in-
eligibility. If the identity of informational function were to serve as a 
bar to patent eligibility, such research will grind to a halt. 
The Supreme Court should instead have focused on the fact that 
isolated DNA and cDNA are merely research, diagnostic, and treat-
ment tools in much the same way as various dyes that are used to 
stain biopsies or centrifuges that are used to separate blood products. 
There is little doubt that dyes, centrifuges, pipettes, and the like are 
all patent-eligible subject matter. The fact that new tools are biologi-
cal rather than mechanical should not change the analysis. Yet this 
fact was lost on the Supreme Court, the petitioners, the solicitor gen-
eral, and even, in some respects, on Myriad itself. This misconception 
led to the illogical and disjointed opinion. 
The Court's opinion, though problematic and at war with itself, 
was not a total loss. The Court did reject the more extreme version 
of the argument pressed by the petitioners and a number of amici, 
which urged the Court to declare all DNA to be patent-ineligible on 
the theory that the functionality of the invented product should de-
cide its eligibility for a patent. Had the Court adopted that argument, 
it would have created significant problems for the biotechnology in-
dustry by essentially declaring that medical innovations that rely on 
biologic solutions (rather than traditional chemical pills) are beyond 
the reach of the Patent Act. The perverse result of such a decision 
33 See FDA, NovoLog Insulin Aspart Label (2013), available at http://www. 
accessdata.fda.gov / drugsatfda_docs/ label! 2005 / 020986s033lbl. pdf. 
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would have been to incentivize less desirable forms of medical treat-
ments while disincentivizing the more desirable kind. Luckily, the 
Court did not go that far, leaving plenty of room for innovation and 
patent protection in biotechnology and biopharmaceuticals. 
But the Court's opinion does sow confusion where none was nec-
essary, especially in light of the previous term's extraordinarily broad 
anti-patent opinion in Mayo. But given the choice between confusion 
remediable in lower courts by careful application of Myriad to new 
facts and complete prohibition on patenting the fruits of genetic re-
search, the former is clearly better. 
IV. Conclusion 
This past term, the Supreme Court faced a number of complicated 
patent questions. Given the Court's recent performance on patent 
law, the industry had much to be concerned about. The Court seemed 
poised to: (1) expand the patent exhaustion doctrine significantly, giv-
ing a new and broad shield to infringers; (2) limit the scope of pat-
ent eligibility, potentially taking an entire industry outside the ambit 
of patent protection; and (3) restrict the ability of patentees to enforce 
their patents not only through litigation, but also through settlement.34 
At the end of the term, however, each industry could breathe a lit-
tle easier. Though the Court did manage to make the law a little less 
patentee-friendly, and did create confusion where none was necessary, 
the outcome was far from the worst-case scenario. That's not to say 
that patentees can fully relax because it remains to be seen how lower 
courts and eventually the Supreme Court answer the questions left 
open and resolve the confusion stemming from this term's decisions. 
But at least patentees will live to fight another day-an outcome that 
was not a given when these cases were set for argument. In short, for 
patentees, the Supreme Court's October Term 2012 can best be charac-
terized by an old Jewish saying: "It could've been worse." 
34 See Actavis, supra note 7. In that case, the Supreme Court did not adopt a bright line, 
per se rule that under antitrust laws, patentees cannot enter certain types of settlement 
agreements with patent challengers. Instead, the Court settled on a "rule of reason" 
analysis that, though more restrictive than the current practice, continues to allow 
the patentees to protect their patents through settlement agreements. Nonetheless, the 
Court's decision sowed much confusion about how to actually apply this new rule. In 
that sense, Actavis's incremental approach is similar to the one taken in Bowman and 
Myriad. 
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